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ABSTRACT
The scale of the tragedy at Rana Plaza in Bangladesh, in which more than
1,000 garment factory workers died when the building collapsed in April
2013, galvanized a range of stakeholders to take action to prevent future
disasters and to acknowledge that business as usual was not an option.
Prominent in these efforts were the Accord on Fire and Building Safety
in Bangladesh (hereafter the Accord) and the Alliance for Bangladesh Work-
ers’ Safety (hereafter the Alliance), two multi-stakeholder agreements that
brought global buyers together in a coordinated effort to improve health
and safety conditions in the ready-made garment industry. These agreements
represented a move away from the buyer-driven, compliance-based model,
which hitherto dominated corporate social responsibility initiatives, to a new
cooperation-based approach. The Accord in particular, which included global
union federations and their local union partners as signatories and held global
firms legally accountable, was described as a ‘paradigm shift’ with the poten-
tial to improve industrial democracy in Bangladesh. This article is concerned
with the experiences and perceptions of workers in the Bangladesh garment
industry regarding these new initiatives. It uses a purposively designed survey
to explore the extent to which these initiatives brought about improvements
in wages and working conditions in the garment industry, to identify where
change was slowest or absent and to ask whether the initiatives did indeed
represent a paradigm shift in efforts to enforce the rights of workers.
This article is part of a project that was funded by the Volkswagen Foundation under its
Europe and Global Challenges programme. The workers’ component was carried out as a
collaboration between the London School of Economics and the BRAC Institute of Governance
and Development, with supplementary funding from ESRC-DFID (ES/ L005484/1). We would
like to thank Adiba Afros, Mahabub Rahman and Saiful Islam for their support in the research.
In addition, we would like to remember our friend and colleague, Simeen Mahmud, who was a
co-investigator on this project, but died on 19 March 2018.
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INTRODUCTION
The Objectives of the Article
The collapse of the Rana Plaza Tower on the outskirts of Dhaka, in
Bangladesh, in April 2013 killed 1,134 and injured many more of the garment
factory workers who were in the building at the time. The scale of the tragedy,
and subsequent worldwide media coverage, turned it into a ‘focusing event’
(Birkland, 1998: 54), triggering policy action on health and safety by a range
of institutional actors, and widespread acknowledgement that ‘business as
usual was not an option’ (Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly, 2014: 11). Promi-
nent among these responses were two initiatives — the Accord on Fire and
Building Safety in Bangladesh (hereafter the Accord) and the Alliance for
Bangladesh Worker Safety (hereafter the Alliance) — which brought global
retailers and brands (hereafter lead firms) into collaboration with other con-
cerned stakeholders to tackle problems in factories from which they sourced
their garments. These initiatives, and the Accord in particular, have been
hailed as ‘historic’ (All Party Parliamentary Group on Bangladesh, 2013:
36), ‘game changing’ (Ryan, 2013) and ‘a new paradigm in the enforcement
of global labour and human rights’ (Anner et al., 2013: 2). They were seen
to represent a move away from the buyer-driven, compliance-based model
which hitherto dominated corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives
in global supply chains, to a more collaborative multi-stakeholder approach.
There has been considerable interest within the CSR community in how
these initiatives performed in the five years or so of their existence. There
have been studies of managers in factories associated with the initiatives
(Anner, 2018) as well as qualitative consultations with various Bangladesh-
based stakeholders (Alamgir and Banerjee, 2019). There have also been
surveys of workers since Rana Plaza (Ahmed and Nathan, 2014; Moazzem
and Azim, 2018), but none have sought to explore the new initiatives from
the perspectives of workers in the industry.
Our article addresses this gap in the literature. It is part of a larger project
which assesses the impact of Rana Plaza from the standpoint of three primary
sets of stakeholders: global lead firms, many sourcing from Bangladesh;
Bangladeshi suppliers to global firms; and Bangladeshi garment workers
producing for global markets. Our analysis draws on a survey of workers
which was purposively designed to explore possible changes in their wages
and working conditions as a result of the new agreements. We use our
findings to speculate on whether the Accord did indeed represent a paradigm
shift in the enforcement of global labour rights or was merely a continuation
of ‘business as usual’ in a different guise. We begin with a brief account of
how stakeholder initiatives, a key concept underpinning this analysis, have
been theorized in the broader CSR literature before going on to discuss our
empirical findings.
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Stakeholder Theory and Global Value Chains: From Compliance to
Collaboration
Early formulations of CSR envisaged entrepreneurs as potential agents of
change who could transform the social order through the introduction of new
progressive values (Falck and Heblich, 2007). This normative vision had to
be abandoned once the focus shifted from the entrepreneur as individual to
enterprises as legal entities in which managers were contractually obliged
to maximize shareholder profits. Attempts to reconcile CSR objectives with
shareholder interests led to more instrumental reformulations. The idea of
‘strategic philanthropy’ (Porter and Kramer, 2002: 56), for instance, argued
that companies could enhance their reputations and thereby increase the
value of their brands by engaging in socially responsible activities.
Stakeholder theory expanded the focus of this argument beyond the firm
to encompass the range of external actors who were affected by, or could
affect, a company’s business activities, and could therefore be considered
to have a stake in its activities (Freeman, 1984). It argued that corporations
should maximize their immediate and longer-term success by factoring these
stakeholders into its business plans, while distinguishing between ‘key’
stakeholders who had direct power to affect their profits, and ‘minor’ or
‘emerging’ ones whose significance varied according to the strength of their
influence.
Arguments for CSR took on fresh life in the context of globalization as
the pursuit of cost-cutting strategies by multinational corporations led to the
relocation of the production of labour-intensive goods and services from the
regulated, high-wage economies of the global North to low-wage, poorly
regulated economies in lower-income countries. The resulting ‘race to the
welfare bottom’ sparked off widespread ‘anti-sweatshop’ activism within
Northern civil society aimed at exposing the violations of internationally
agreed labour standards entailed in these strategies.
The threat to the reputations of multinational corporations and, by ex-
tension, to their profits posed by this ‘emerging’ category of stakeholders
helped to shift corporate strategies from seeking to exploit the governance
gap in supply chain capitalism to attempting to fill it through voluntary reg-
ulation. This took the form of corporate codes of conduct (CoCs), backed by
periodic audits, which required supplying firms to comply with minimum
labour standards as the condition for doing business with lead firms.
The adoption of this approach since the 1990s resulted in the rapid pro-
liferation of codes, but subsequent evaluations reported mixed, often disap-
pointing, results (Barrientos and Smith, 2007; Egels-Zandén, 2007; Lund-
Thomsen et al., 2012; Oxfam, 2013). Impacts were generally limited to
outcome standards, such as minimum wages and health, with little change
in the less tangible ‘process’ rights to freedom of association and collec-
tive bargaining embodied in core International Labour Organization (ILO)
principles. Impacts also tended to be restricted to first-tier factories which
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dealt directly with global buyers, bypassing lower-tier factories working on
a subcontracted basis. In addition, the top-down approach of the compliance
model led to considerable resentment on the part of suppliers, accompanied
by efforts at evasion and deception.
However, even as disillusionment with corporate codes set in among some
of its civil society advocates, support for CSR was growing among official
development agencies where the turn to neoliberal ideologies of market-led
growth carved out a prominent role for socially responsible business as a
key agent of poverty reduction (Blowfield, 2005; Jenkins, 2005). Stake-
holder theory was re-conceptualized yet again, this time to move beyond
the instrumental concerns of individual corporations to a broader ‘develop-
mental’ perspective which argued that, whatever the interests of particular
stakeholders, they could reap mutual gains from collaborative efforts to im-
prove working conditions in their value chains and, by extension, in workers’
living standards in developing countries (Blowfield, 2005; Lund-Thomsen
and Lindgreen, 2014).
The thinking behind this ‘win-win’ rationale was spelt out explicitly in
relation to global garment value chains in a World Bank evaluation of the
ILO’s Better Works programme,1 one example of the new collaborative
approach (Kotikula et al., 2015). It pointed out that while lead firms might
make sourcing decisions on the basis of profitability considerations, they
had an incentive to improve working conditions in the factories from which
they sourced in order to avoid reputational risk. Their suppliers might baulk
at the costs of improving working conditions in their factories, but would
gain if this helped to increase worker productivity or suppliers’ competitive
edge in gaining orders. Governments could benefit from improving work-
ing conditions in their export industries if it helped them attract foreign
investment and boost exports. Finally, workers had an unambiguous stake in
good working conditions because it enhanced their quality of life and could
increase their productivity.
However, the shift from compliance to cooperation in the CSR literature
did not silence all its critics. Scholars argued that, for all the new rhetoric
about shared stakeholder interests, CSR initiatives had to operate in a wider
political economy in which the raison d’etre of corporations continued to be
defined, first and foremost, in terms of shareholder dividends (Margolis and
Walsh, 2003). Some questioned whether cooperation was ever possible be-
tween unequally positioned stakeholders interacting with each other within
an intensely competitive global economy. As Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen
(2014: 18) note: ‘In this competitive context, there is very little scope for co-
operation, beyond the limits set by international consumer markets’. These
debates, and their different perspectives on stakeholder theory, provide the
1. For more information on the ILO’s Better Works programme, see: www.ilo.org/global/
programmes-and-projects/WCMS_084616/lang-de/index.htm
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point of departure for our analysis of the collaborative initiatives put in place
in Bangladesh after Rana Plaza.
Background to the Study: The Export Garment Industry in Bangladesh
The positive side of the story of the export ready-made garment (RMG)
industry in Bangladesh is its spectacular growth. From a handful of factories
in the late 1970s, the industry grew to 5,876 registered factories by 2013
while its share of the country’s exports rose from 4 per cent in the 1980s to
around 80 per cent.2 It currently employs between 4 and 5 million workers,
depending on estimates used (Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly, 2015).3 While
earlier studies reported that over 80 per cent of this labour force were women
(War on Want, 2011), the rise of knitwear manufacturing has led to a shift
in its gender composition so that men now make up around 54 per cent of
the labour force (Farole and Cho, 2017). The rapid growth of the industry
can be attributed to the apparently inexhaustible supply of cheap, largely
female labour migrating from the countryside in search of employment.
The industry also benefited from the efforts of successive governments to
provide incentives to local capital as part of its drive to increase the country’s
export earnings. These efforts were reinforced by the early emergence of the
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA)
in the 1970s as a powerful lobby for employers’ interests.
However, there is also a negative side to the story which relates to the
working conditions which fuelled this growth. Bangladesh is signatory to
most of the ILO’s core labour conventions, but enforcement has been weak,
deliberately so in the export RMG sector. The government passed a new
Labour Law in 20064 which consolidated and updated previous legislation
but with sections of the political elite themselves owners of garment factories,
the new legislation was limited in scope. For instance, it retained restrictions
on workers’ rights, including requirements of 30 per cent representation of
workers in a factory and of approval by the Labour Directorate before a
union could be registered.
The weakness of the country’s trade union movement partly reflects these
factors. Many unions are poorly resourced and their efforts to organize
within factories have been blocked by the government and met with violent
repression by employers (Rahman and Langford, 2012). Left-leaning unions,
2. For trade information of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association
(BGMEA) see: www.bgmea.com.bd/home/pages/tradeinformation# (accessed 5 December
2018).
3. There are suggestions that there may be more than 7,000 factories in the country if unreg-
istered, indirectly sourced factories are taken into account (Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly,
2015). This would increase the official estimates of workers by an additional million.
4. For more information on the 2006 Bangladesh Labour Law, see: www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/
docs/ELECTRONIC/76402/110637/F-1265526237/BGD76402%20Eng.pdf
Workers’ Views on Multi-stakeholder Initiatives in Bangladesh 1365
in particular, have been systematically denied registration by the two main
parties that dominated national politics since the 1990s (ibid.). As a result,
Bangladesh has few factory-based unions and those that exist must rely on
the support of national union federations. At the same time, most national
federations are affiliated to the major political parties and have a long history
of disruptive politics in which party interests generally dominate over those
of the membership (ibid.).
This confluence of factors mean that the industry has long been character-
ized by the absence of written contracts, by routine violations of health and
safety regulations, low wages, long hours of overtime, high rates of labour
turnover and low levels of trade union membership, estimated at around 5
to 10 per cent (Khan and Wichterich, 2015). Not surprisingly, Bangladesh
has featured prominently in anti-sweatshop campaigns and seen a prolif-
eration of CoCs by lead firms seeking to do business in the country. But
these were mainly focused on working conditions within factories rather
than infrastructural safety.
The collapse of Rana Plaza propelled health and safety concerns to the
forefront of the policy agenda. The US immediately suspended Bangladesh
from tariff-free access to its markets. The EU used the threat of suspen-
sion to launch the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact with the Bangladesh
government, the US, Canada and the ILO in order to hold the government
to time-bound commitments to improve fire and building safety and labour
rights (ibid.). The Bangladesh government for its part adopted a National
Tripartite Plan of Action for Fire and Structural Integrity and passed the
Labour (Amendment) Act 20135 to make trade union registration easier, to
improve health and safety regulations and to upgrade labour inspections.
The other prominent outcome was, of course, the adoption of the two
multi-stakeholder initiatives. The Accord was an agreement between more
than 200 international brands from 20 mainly European countries and two
global union federations (UNIGlobal Union and IndustriAll Global Union)
along with eight IndustriAll-affiliated Bangladeshi unions. It also included
four international labour rights NGOs as witness signatories. The much
smaller Alliance came into existence a few months later with 27 brands,
overwhelmingly from North America, as signatories. Estimates (based on
both registered and unregistered factories) suggest that the two agreements
covered around 27 per cent of factories in the RMG sector and 45 per cent
of its workers (Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly, 2015).6
There has been some debate as to whether the two initiatives should be
treated as essentially similar manifestations of new collaborative approaches
5. See: www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=94286&p_classification=
01.02
6. The government took responsibility under its Tripartite Plan for oversight over factories
that did not supply to members of Accord and Alliance. There is less information on this
initiative but what exists suggests that it has not made much headway (Barrett et al., 2018).
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to CSR or as fundamentally different. Barrett et al. (2018) support the former
position. They argue that both initiatives emerged as ‘innovation out of
crisis’ (ibid.: 11) and functioned in much the same way: their inspection
teams examined whether conditions in firms supplying the signatory brands
complied with the country’s building code and drew up corrective plans
where necessary to be implemented by managers within a prescribed time
frame. Both agreements provided for the setting up of Health and Safety
Committees in factories and for training in worker safety. Both were intended
to last for five years with funding provided by annual contributions from
signatory firms.7
Donaghey and Reinecke (2018) offer a different interpretation. The Ac-
cord, they argue, embodied basic principles of industrial democracy. It was
an agreement between global buyers and international union federations and
their local affiliates. It included four international labour NGOs as witness
signatories and the ILO as neutral chair. It was legally binding in that fail-
ure by signatory brands to abide by their commitments could be taken up
in courts in their home countries. It also placed considerable emphasis on
building workers’ capacity for voice and representation at the core of its
safety processes, working closely with local affiliates of its global union
partners.
By contrast, Donaghey and Reinecke view the Alliance as a ‘fairly tradi-
tional CSR approach’ (2018: 15) but with collective self-regulation. It was
led by anti-union US brands who were not willing to sign up to legally
binding commitments. It did not include any unions among its signatories,
although it did provide some local unions and a major Bangladeshi NGO
with an advisory role. The authors describe its approach to factory-level
change as one of ‘problem-solving’ rather than ‘capacity building’ (ibid.:
28).
The methodology used to select workers for our survey does not allow us to
separate out the impacts associated with the Accord and Alliance on workers’
voice and representation in order to test the hypothesis suggested by these
debates. As we describe below, the majority of workers in our sample were
from factories affiliated with the Accord either on its own or jointly with the
Alliance. However, in light of the claims made for the potential for industrial
democracy embodied in the Accord, and the significant representation of
Accord-affiliated factories in our sample, we are able to explore a different
hypothesis: that affiliation with the Accord was associated with changes that
went beyond the health and safety concerns which had provided the initial
impetus for the agreement to include impacts relating to workers’ voice and
representation.
7. At the end of its five-year mandate, Alliance withdrew from Bangladesh. Accord went to
court to seek an extension to complete the process of remediation. In May 2019, it came
to an agreement to continue its work for another 281 working days after which a national
council would take over.
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Methodology and Description of Sample
Our research set out to explore the perspectives of workers on possible
changes associated with the Accord and Alliance since their inception. In
2017, we carried out a survey of 1,500 workers from 240 factories in five
sites in and around Dhaka, where much of the export industry is located.
Ideally, we would have liked to have sampled workers from the factories
covered by the survey of managers carried out as part of the same project.
However, we were reluctant to allow managers from these factories to help
us select our sample because of obvious dangers of selection bias and efforts
to influence workers’ responses.
We opted instead to select our sample from specific locations within
or next to Dhaka district — Savar, Ashulia, Gazipur, Narayanganj and
Dhaka city — based on the fact that they had the greatest concentration
of the factories included in the management survey. We then focused on one
neighbourhood in each location where the workers in these factories were
most likely to reside. In each of these five neighbourhoods, 1,000 garment
worker households were identified and 200 women and 100 men randomly
selected from each neighbourhood sub-sample. This gave us a total sample
of 1,500 workers (1,000 women and 500 men) evenly distributed across
the five locations.8 The survey was carried out in workers’ homes with their
consent, by prior appointment and with assurance of full confidentiality. The
first step in our analysis was to classify the workers in our sample according
to whether their factories were affiliated with either of the initiatives, but
we faced the problem that many had either not heard of these agreements
or did not know their factory’s affiliation status. We consulted the Accord,
Alliance and government websites to fill in this information.
Table 1 provides basic information on the factories in our sample.9 It uses
BGMEA criteria to distinguish between small (<600 workers), medium
(600–2,499) and large (2,500+) factories. Around 40 per cent of factories,
but just 17 per cent of workers, fell into the small category, 39 per cent of
factories and 37 per cent of workers fell in the medium category and 21
per cent of factories but as many as 46 per cent of workers fell in the large
category. From the entire sample of workers, 29 per cent were affiliated
to the Accord, 52.5 per cent to both the Accord and Alliance (A&A) and
just 1.5 per cent were affiliated to the Alliance on its own. It is therefore
important to note that when we refer to ‘A&A-affiliate’ factories in this
study, we are referring to factories that are either affiliated with the Accord
on its own or jointly with the Alliance. The remaining 17 per cent of workers
from factories that were not affiliated to either agreement was treated as a
form of ‘control’ group. The distribution of A&A affiliation by factory size
8. In the end, less than 10 per cent of the workers in our sample came from factories covered
by the managers’ sample.
9. A more comprehensive report of our findings can be found in Kabeer et al. (2019).
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varied in predictable ways. Only 32 per cent of workers in small factories
were in A&A-affiliated factories compared to 86 per cent and 96 per cent
in medium and large factories respectively. Workers in affiliated factories,
particularly the larger ones, were more accurately informed about affiliation
status of their factories than those in non-affiliated factories who were more
likely to say that they ‘did not know’.
Table 2 provides a brief description of the workers in our sample. It
compares workers in small factories with those from medium and large
factories combined.10 Among workers in our sample, 66 per cent were
female (a reflection of the survey design), with little variation by factory
size and A&A affiliation. The mean age of workers was 26.5 years, their
mean years of education was 5.9; 77 per cent were married and the vast
majority (87 per cent) had migrated to their current location specifically in
response to opportunities in the RMG sector. They had spent a mean of 5.6
years in the industry and 3.6 years in their current factory.
For the analysis, we disaggregated the main question motivating this ar-
ticle into two sub-questions. First, to what extent did wages and working
conditions differ between A&A-affiliated and non-affiliated factories? Stud-
ies have generally shown that wages and working conditions are better in the
larger, often first-tier factories which deal directly with lead firms and are
hence under greater international scrutiny than those at the smaller, usually
subcontracted end. We wanted to know whether A&A affiliation made any
difference to wages and working conditions, regardless of factory size. And
secondly, could any differences that we found be attributed to the efforts of
the two initiatives?
Our analysis explored these questions using objective indicators of wages
and working conditions along with subjective indicators of workers’ views
and perceptions of these issues, including their views on whether and what
kinds of changes had occurred in the aftermath of Rana Plaza. Table 3 pro-
vides descriptive statistics on the differences in these objective and subjective
indicators by A&A affiliation and factory size, distinguishing between small
factories and medium/large ones11 and will be discussed in the course of the
analysis.
In the next stage of the study, we used regression analysis to separate out
the possible influence of A&A affiliation and factory size on selected indi-
cators of wages and working conditions as well as on changes reported in
these since Rana Plaza. The results of the regression analysis are reported in
10. Since the main purpose of our investigation is to assess the difference made to wages
and working conditions by A&A affiliation independent of factory size, keeping large and
medium categories of factories separate would have left us with excessively small sample
sizes of non-A&A workers (76 and 26 respectively) with low precision of estimates.
11. It should be noted here that there was considerable similarity between medium and large
factories in these indicators, justifying our decision to treat them as one category (Kabeer
et al., 2019).
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Tables 4a, 4b and 5. We used Ordinary Least Squares as our preferred regres-
sion model for both continuous and binary variables. The main reasons for
selecting linear probability models for binary outcomes are for simplicity of
interpretation and comparability of the specifications throughout the paper.
Since the focus of our study was to identify correlates of wages, working
conditions and voice in the factories rather than making predictions, Ordi-
nary Least Squares is likely to produce the same conclusions as non-linear
models (such as logit or probit).12
We decided to conduct a number of focus group discussions (FGDs) after
a preliminary analysis of the survey data in order gain a better understanding
of our quantitative findings. Seven FGDs were carried out between August
and September 2018 in the areas from which our sample was drawn, four
with male workers and three with female. Each group consisted of between
six and eight participants, together adding up to a total of 54 participants.
They included helpers, quality controllers, finishers, ironmen, a supervisor
and a large number of machine operators. Seven of them were from Accord-
affiliated factories, 11 from Alliance-affiliated factories, four from factories
affiliated to both, nine from factories described as ‘compliant’, 14 from
‘non-compliant’ factories and nine did not know the status of their factories.
WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS: EXPLORING THE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN AFFILIATED AND NON-AFFILIATED FACTORIES
Wages and Working Hours
We begin our analysis with the issue of wages, identified in our survey as
one of the workers’ most important priorities. Wages are also an important
priority for employers but in the reverse direction. Given that the competitive
advantage of the RMG sector in Bangladesh lies in the low costs of its
labour, employers have sought to use their considerable influence with the
government to keep wages at very low levels. The monthly minimum wage
for unskilled workers in the sector was first set in 1994 at 930 Bangladeshi
Takas (US$ 23.25). It remained frozen at that level for over a decade until
massive protests by workers in May 2006 forced a rise to 1,662 Takas (US$
24.80). It was subsequently raised to 3,000 Takas (US$ 43.40) in 2010,
to 5,300 Takas (US$ 65) in 2014 and then, in December 2018, to 8,000
Takas (US$ 95). Each raise was preceded by a period of intense agitation by
workers, a point we will return to later.
12. This was borne out by a comparison with results using logistic regression analysis for
binary outcome indicators. Regression analysis was also done for these outcome indicators
by adding various control variables for worker characteristics. The direction and significance
of coefficients for A&A affiliation and factory size were largely similar.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Workers’ Views on Multi-stakeholder Initiatives in Bangladesh 1377
Monthly earnings are made up of basic salary, overtime (OT) earnings and
any bonuses offered by a factory. Workers in our survey reported a mean
basic salary of 7,299 Takas for the previous month, increasing to 8,669 with
overtime payments and to 8,993 Takas with attendance bonus (the main
form paid) (see Table 3). Average basic salaries in our sample were thus
higher than the prevailing minimum wage of 5,300 Takas, even in the small
non-A&A affiliated factories. However, only 45 per cent of the workers in
our survey believed that their wages were fair. This may reflect the fact that
wages generally fell short of various estimates of the ‘living wage’ which
attempt to take account of the effects of inflation on the cost of living. These
vary from the Asia Floor Wage region-wide estimate of 36,385 Takas (US$
454) to the Fair Labour Association estimate for Bangladesh of 7,797 Takas
(US$ 97).
The length of the working day has received considerable attention in the
literature on export garment manufacturing because, as Locke (2013) points
out, long hours of overtime appear to have acquired the status of a norm
in this sector. The 2006 Bangladesh Labour Law stipulated that the daily
work shift could not exceed 8 hours while the upper limit to overtime was
2 hours. Workers reported an average of 8 hours of work a day, but the
average amount of overtime when work pressure was high was 3.3 hours,
exceeding the legal limit. In addition, 83 per cent reported that overtime
was compulsory. Asked about their working hours, including overtime, 65
per cent of the workers declared they were either satisfied or indifferent
while 35 per cent declared themselves dissatisfied. Since the table does not
show much difference in overtime hours worked by factory size or A&A
affiliation, variations in satisfaction with working hours clearly reflected
other factors.
The indicators used to capture different aspects of wages for the regression
analysis were basic salary, basic salary with overtime payment and bonuses,
and whether workers considered their salaries to be fair. The indicators for
demands on workers’ time were the number of hours worked, including
overtime, whether overtime was compulsory and whether workers were sat-
isfied with their hours of work. The results of the regression analysis support
the finding that there was very little difference in basic salaries and working
hours by either affiliation status or factory size (see Table 4a). Significant
differences in earnings by affiliation status only emerged once overtime pay-
ments and bonuses were added to basic salaries, with differences ranging
from around 1,000 Takas among workers in larger affiliated factories to
around 300 Takas in smaller ones.
The results also suggest that while compulsory overtime was widespread,
its likelihood was lower in A&A-affiliated factories, particularly the larger
ones. As we noted earlier, incentives such as higher overtime payments
and bonuses appeared more common in these factories. Workers in A&A-
affiliated factories were more likely to believe that they earned a fair wage
than those in non-A&A factories and more likely to report satisfaction with
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their working hours. Factory size did not appear to make much difference
to these indicators, but the coefficient for the interaction term suggested that
workers in smaller factories affiliated with A&A were not very different
from smaller non-A&A factories in terms of compulsory overtime or belief
in fairness of salaries.
Our FGDs provided further insights into workers’ perspectives on wages
and working hours. On the question of wages, complaints from participants
echoed the wider literature about the effects of inflation. They particularly
highlighted the issue of rents, their single largest monthly expense, as a
major source of tension. Not only did housing rents rise at a higher rate than
the price of other essentials but increments in wages were frequently wiped
out by the accompanying hike in rents. As one male worker with Accord
complained: ‘If our salary is raised by two Takas, our rent is increased by
four Takas’.13
The discussion about working hours helped to disentangle different
sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Some workers welcomed the
opportunity to do overtime (‘within reason’) because it increased their earn-
ings, allowing them to improve their living standard, support their families
or save for the future. Lower-paid workers, such as helpers and less skilled
machinists, had no choice but to do overtime to make ends meet. Several
women with young children said they would have preferred to forego addi-
tional overtime earnings in order to get home earlier.
Paradoxically, some workers identified reductions in working hours as a
major source of dissatisfaction. Reductions occurred as a result of stricter
enforcement of legal limits on working hours since Rana Plaza, but they had
been accompanied in many factories by an increase in the hourly production
targets that workers were expected to meet. According to one female worker
with Accord, ‘We now have to complete 10 to 12 hours of work within
8 hours . . . whereas previously we may have produced 120 pieces per
hour, now we have to produce 150 to 200 pieces per hour’.14 Pressure to
work harder also increased with rising wages, with managers demanding
higher productivity to compensate for higher wages. Complaints about the
unfairness of wages thus reflected not only their inadequacy relative to rising
costs of living, but also their failure to reflect increasing work intensity.
Job Security and Social Benefits
The 2006 Bangladesh Labour Law made it compulsory for employers to issue
written appointment letters and identity cards to all workers and upgrade
workers to permanent status after they completed the agreed probation period
of a year. The law also entitled workers to one day’s holiday in the week;
13. Focus group discussion, Savar, 3 August 2018.
14. Focus group discussion, Narayanganj, 21 September 2018.
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10 days of paid holiday in the year, 11 days of festival leave, 16 weeks of
paid maternity leave and up to 14 days of paid sick leave. These provisions
have enormous potential to contribute to workers’ job security, occupational
mobility and social welfare. Appointment letters serve as a de facto contract,
specifying terms and conditions and enabling workers to prove their status
as employees with the full rights of employees. Identification cards provide
proof of employment, should workers seek to enforce their rights in the
labour courts. They also record the expertise and experience of workers
and hence allow them to bargain for appropriate wage levels when they
move to new factories. Permanent status entitles workers to full legal rights,
including written notice of dismissal or wages in lieu and entitlements to
holidays and paid leave allow workers to rest, recuperate and spend time
with their families.
As detailed in Table 3, over 95 per cent of workers had permanent status,
95 per cent had identity cards, 62 per cent had written letters of appointment,
91 per cent had paid leave and 90 per cent had maternity leave. According to
our FGDs, these rules had existed previously, but many workers had either
not known of their existence or had not known how to take advantage of
them. Reports about the actual observance of these rights varied between
the better factories where holidays were observed, child care support and
medical facilities provided and requests for leave respected, and those where
procedures to claim rights were deliberately made complicated, where leave
was often denied and maternity benefits withheld. Table 4a reports on the
results of regression analysis on selected indicators of job security and paid
leave. These included: an index of job security based on whether the worker
received written letters of appointment and possessed an identity card (its
value ranged from 0 to 2); and a social benefits index based on whether they
reported paid leave and maternity leave (its value ranged from 0 to 2). In
addition, in order to capture whether these formal provisions gave workers a
greater sense of job security, we asked them if they believed that they could
be fired at any time. Around 37 per cent of the overall sample said that they
believed this to be the case.
The regression results suggest that A&A affiliation was positively asso-
ciated with both the indexes and that it reduced the likelihood that workers
believed that they could be fired at any time. Smaller factories reported lower
values for both indexes, but factory size did not appear to affect perceived
job security. The results for the interaction terms suggest the positive asso-
ciation between A&A affiliation and the job security and benefits indexes
varied by firm size, with weaker ‘effects’ in smaller factories.
Health and Safety
Problems of health and safety in factory conditions have a long history
within the RMG industry. The UK Parliamentary Group’s report on the
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Rana Plaza disaster drew attention to the succession of audits over the
years that routinely reported on these problems: ‘In lesser infringements,
fire extinguishers may be out of date or exit routes may be blocked. More
serious misdemeanours may see gates between floors locked, significant
overcrowding on the factory floor, windows barred, and electrical equip-
ment exposed’ (All Party Parliamentary Group on Bangladesh, 2013: 23).
But despite a series of deadly accidents in the RMG sector prior to Rana
Plaza, both buyers and suppliers turned a blind eye to hazardous factory
conditions.
The situation changed dramatically after Rana Plaza. The EU Sustainabil-
ity Compact prioritized government action on this front. The 2013 Labour
Act15 included better regulation of stairway and gangways, provision of
safety equipment, regular fire drills and strengthened factory inspection. It
also required the setting up of Health and Safety Committees (HSCs) in
all factories with 50 or more workers in order to coordinate efforts around
health and safety within the factory. Worker representatives on the com-
mittees were either to be drawn from trade union members in the factory
or, in the absence of a trade union, appointed by members of the Worker
Participation Committees (WPCs; see below). In addition, of course, health
and safety featured centrally in the Accord and Alliance agreements.
Our survey suggests that these provisions had been implemented in most
factories: 90 per cent of workers in our survey reported an HSC in their
factory and 85 per cent had received health and safety training. We also
asked workers a number of questions to elicit their subjective perceptions of
safety. The overwhelming majority of workers (95 per cent) said that they
felt safe working in their present factory while 90 per cent said they could
refuse to go into a building if they thought it was unsafe.
The FGDs strongly supported this overall picture of improvement. Almost
all the participants had undergone health and safety training, often multiple
times, and spoke knowledgeably about the changes they observed: regular
inspection by engineers, the closing down of unsafe factories and the renova-
tion of others, the setting up of the HSCs, the installation of fire extinguishers
on every floor, the widening of exit staircases, regular fire drills, first aid
boxes, the need for masks while working and the importance of keeping
walkways and aisles clear of obstructions. Several workers confirmed that
they felt sufficiently empowered to refuse to work in an unsafe environ-
ment: ‘If we see a crack on the wall or are concerned with our safety, now
we can certainly speak up’ said one male worker (with unknown factory
status) in an interview.16 ‘Everyone has this right. We have been watch-
ing various videos, learning about our rights and safety through different
15. For more on the 2013 Bangladesh Labour Act, see: www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?
p_lang=en&p_isn=94286&p_classification=01.02
16. Focus group discussion, male factory worker, Savar, 7 September 2018.
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organizations like Accord and Alliance’ commented another male worker
from an Accord-affiliated factory.17
The results of the regression analysis in Table 4b suggest these improve-
ments in health and safety conditions went further in A&A-affiliated facto-
ries: regardless of factory size, their workers were significantly more likely
to report HSCs in their factories, to have undergone training in health and
safety and to believe that their factories were safe. However, there was no
significant difference in the likelihood of workers saying they would not en-
ter an unsafe building, suggesting that this particular change was widespread
across factories.
Awareness, Representation and Voice
Although policy responses to Rana Plaza gave central place to health and
safety provisions, there was also renewed attention to questions of workers’
awareness, voice and representation, reflecting widespread consensus on the
view put forward by Human Rights Watch (2015: 4): ‘If workers at Rana
Plaza had more of a voice, it is entirely possible that the circumstances that
led to the thousands of deaths and injuries could have been prevented’. This
was also one of the reasons why, as Donaghey and Reinecke (2018) point
out, the Accord agreement stressed the importance of building workers’
voice as part of its safety processes.
The 2013 Labour Act relaxed restrictions on trade union registration and
strengthened other mechanisms for worker representation. The ILO esti-
mated that 527 new trade unions had registered in the garment sector since
2013 so that there were 611 trade unions and 48 union federations by 2018.18
Worth noting is the observation by a local newspaper that the newly reg-
istered unions were ‘overwhelmingly affiliated’ with Solidarity Center, a
labour NGO allied to US’s largest trade union federation (Siddiqi, 2017:
68). Animosity towards left-wing unions, on the other hand, remained strong
on the part of factory owners and their efforts to register continued to be
blocked by the BGMEA, often with the backing of the government (Hossain
and Hossain, forthcoming; Siddiqi, 2017).
The 2013 Labour Act also sought to strengthen Workers’ Participation
Committees. The 2006 legislation stipulated that WPCs made up of repre-
sentatives of managers and workers had to be set up in any factory with
50 or more workers in order to provide a platform for social dialogue, par-
ticularly important in factories where there were no trade unions. While
half of the committees should have been nominated by union leaders or
elected by workers, in reality, their membership was mainly nominated by
17. Focus group discussion, male Accord-affiliated factory worker, Savar, 7 September 2018.
18. See: www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13101:0::NO:13101:P13101_COMMENT_
ID:2252760
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employers (International Federation for Human Rights, 2008). The amended
act required open election of workers’ representatives to WPCs.
Our survey included various questions to measure knowledge, voice and
representation within the factories (see Table 3). In terms of knowledge, it is
indicative of the relative significance attached to various forms of governance
within factories that 71 per cent of the workers knew about codes of conduct
but only 40 per cent knew about the country’s labour laws. Most learnt about
the codes from posters and information provided by management, practices
that clearly did not extend to the country’s labour laws. It is also indicative
of current priorities that while a vast majority of workers (85 per cent) had
undergone training in health and safety, only 6 per cent of them had received
training on rights, negotiations and collective bargaining.
To explore the issue of voice and representation, the survey included
questions about the role of trade unions and WPCs. Only 4 per cent of the
workers said that there was a trade union in their factory, 35 per cent said
that there was no trade union in their factory and, tellingly, 61 per cent said
they did not know whether there was one or not. None of the workers was
associated with a trade union outside the factory. By contrast, 78 per cent of
workers said that there was a WPC in their factory and, significantly, 80 per
cent of these said that members of the WPC were elected. Since elections to
WPCs were only made mandatory in 2014 after Rana Plaza, we can assume
this is a relatively recent change.
Asked about the role of the WPCs, 83 per cent of workers agreed that they
could openly express their views to the WPC; 77 per cent said that the WPC
looked out for their complaints; 64 per cent believed that management gave
the WPCs importance; 66 per cent believed that the committees were effec-
tive, while similar percentages believed that they gave satisfactory solutions
(Kabeer et al., 2019). We used these responses to develop a WPC effective-
ness index with a scale of 0 to 5. Workers in A&A factories systematically
reported higher values than those in non-affiliated factories, regardless of
factory size: their overall index was 3.8 compared to 0.8 in non-affiliated
factories.
The results of the regression analysis suggest that affiliation with A&A was
positively associated with knowledge of codes of conduct and labour laws,
with the likelihood of a WPC in the factory, with the likelihood of elected
WPCs and with the WPC effectiveness index (see Table 4b). These indicators
did not vary by factory size but the interaction term between factory size
and A&A affiliation suggested that among A&A-affiliated factories, smaller
factories were less likely to have a WPC than larger ones and were less likely
to have effective WPCs.
The FGDs touched on the different channels through which workers could
express their grievances: supervisors, line managers, ‘compliance’ madams,
WPCs, complaint boxes and Alliance telephone help lines. In line with the
survey results, most FGD participants considered the WPCs more effective
than other mechanisms but they varied considerably in their assessments
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of WPCs’ achievements. The more positive among them valued the fact
that they could take complaints to WPC members who were often able to
resolve them through discussions with the appropriate level of management.
However, it appeared from the examples they gave that their complaints
generally related to a limited, and often mundane, range of issues: fresh soap
for the bathroom; fixing bathroom taps; replacing the water filter; supporting
requests for leave; arbitrating disputes between workers and remonstrating
with abusive supervisors.
The less positive argued that these were the only issues that WPCs were in
a position to deal with. They pointed out that WPC members were workers
like themselves; they were not given time off to carry out their duties and
faced the same pressures to complete their production targets. Nor could
they risk their jobs by raising controversial issues. Some FGD participants
went further to express the view that once a worker was elected to the WPC,
they became a tool of management. In the view of a male worker from an
Accord-affiliated factory, the WPCs were more effective if their members
had been backed by Accord or Alliance: ‘Just like the government, it is not
enough for the worker representatives to be elected, they need to be given
control and power to be more effective’.19
On the question of trade unions, the FGDs confirmed that there was negli-
gible trade union presence within the factories. Many added that anyone
found out to be a union member was likely to be sacked. The discussion
therefore focused on trade union federations and their role in promoting
workers’ rights. Here knowledge and opinions varied. First, there were sev-
eral workers, mainly women, who were not very clear about the role of
these federations. Second, there were those, most often from A&A-affiliated
factories, who said that they did not feel the need to approach federations as
their problems were generally solved within the factory.
The third focus group had stronger and largely positive views about trade
unions. The question of unfair dismissal was singled out as an issue which
trade unions were better placed to handle than WPCs. Once workers were
dismissed, they had no access to WPC members since they were barred
from crossing the factory gates. Trade unions, on the other hand, had offices
outside the factories and provided a safe space for workers’ complaints.
However, it also became clear that FGD participants were not always
talking about the same kinds of federations. Some were talking about local
affiliates of the global federations who signed Accord and whose power
derived from this association: ‘These unions have the telephone number of
every single buyer and employer. If there is a problem and the federation
inform the buyers, that factory will not get any orders’ said one male worker
(unknown factory status).20 Members of these unions clearly worked closely
19. Focus group discussion, male worker from an Accord-affiliated factory, Gazipur, 14 Septem-
ber 2018.
20. Focus group discussion, Savar, 7 September 2018.
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with Accord, they were able to participate in the inspection processes, to
take up workers’ grievances directly with managers, and to threaten legal
action, often invoking the authority of the Accord to press their case (see
also Zajak, 2017). This strand of unionism was thus associated with social
dialogue, negotiation and legal action.
Other FGD participants were referring to the local union federations, often
unregistered, which generally supported workers in the ‘normal’ (in other
words, non-compliant) factories. These were described as older federations,
whose leaders had been around from ‘much earlier’. The workers in these
factories were less likely to have WPCs, or effective WPCs, they had little
scope for solving their problems within the factories and were more likely
to take their complaints to outside ‘worker leaders’. The unions in question
did not always have the resources to fight legal cases. Their power lay
in their ability to mobilize street-level protests. As a male worker from a
non-affiliated factory told us: ‘Worker leaders organized and protested to
increase the wage to 5,300 Takas. I hear they are planning to do this again
soon. It would be good for us’.21 A female worker from a non-affiliated
factory, who had participated in such a protest in the past, recalled: ‘The
workers were organized by outsiders who are worker leaders. They threw
bricks at the windows of our factories and demanded that all of us join
them to show solidarity. They said, “why shouldn’t you join us, we are all
workers”’.22
Dignity at Work
Our focus so far has been on aspects of wages and working conditions that
are either mandated by the country’s labour laws and/or covered by corporate
codes of conduct. However, some aspects of working conditions, specifically
relationships and behaviour within factories, are difficult to regulate and
hence do not appear in the codification of labour standards at national,
corporate or international levels. Yet, as studies have suggested, these aspects
have long been a problem within the RMG industry (Mahmud and Kabeer,
2006; Siddiqi, 2003).
This was borne out by our survey, in which 75 per cent of workers stated
that they had experienced mistreatment in their current factory, with some-
what higher percentages reporting it in non-A&A factories (see Table 3).
Verbal abuse featured most frequently: 89 per cent of the workers observed
it in relation to others, 81 per cent maintained that it occurred frequently and
87 per cent reported that they had experienced it themselves. Other forms of
21. Focus group discussion, Narayanganj, 21 September 2018. In fact, thousands of workers
did go out on strike in January 2019 to protest for higher wages.
22. Focus group discussion, Mirpur, 10 August 2018.
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mistreatment observed by workers included humiliating forms of behaviour
(68 per cent), use of threats (46 per cent), regulated toilet breaks (24 per cent)
and physical abuse (24 per cent). Supervisors were singled out by 80 per
cent of the workers as most verbally abusive while 9 per cent singled them
out as most physically abusive. The main reasons given for mistreatment
were making mistakes (77 per cent), failure to meet production targets (61
per cent), working too slowly (33 per cent) and absence from work (22 per
cent).
Among the FGDs, only a minority of participants, mainly from the larger,
A&A-affiliated factories, believed that behaviour on the factory floor had
improved over time. They explained this in terms of new mechanisms for
registering their complaints, greater awareness on the part of workers and
greater willingness to speak up, as well as to the pressures exerted on their
behalf by external actors, including buyers and unions. The rest testified to
widespread abuse, linking it with employers’ overriding preoccupation with
meeting production targets. Some believed that levels of abuse had increased
since Rana Plaza as a result of the intensification of workloads noted earlier:
‘No one can be absent or late for work, no one can pause in their work, no one
can leave their work station at any time . . . these regulations did not exist
before, they have become stricter now. If we cannot meet the production
target, then there is no end to their scolding’.23
While most FGD participants focused their anger on supervisors as the
immediate perpetrators of abuse, some offered more systemic explanations
of abusive behaviour. As a female worker from an A&A factory pointed out,
supervisors had their own production targets: ‘There is no point in always
complaining about the supervisor . . . . The in-charge is above the supervisor,
he will beat up the supervisor if he is unable to meet his targets’.24 A male
worker from an A&A factory told us how he came to realize that abusive
behaviour was built into the logic of factory life. He had once fallen behind
on his work and been summoned along with his newly recruited quality
manager to the general manager’s office. While he fully expected the tirade
of abuse he received, he was shocked by the level of abuse directed at his
new manager:
This is how the verbal abuse system works . . . above this man is the in-charge, above him
is the production manager, then the assistant general manager and then the general manager.
The abuse starts at the top and gets passed down to each lower level . . . And I know if my
job was at risk, I would also put pressure on those below me.25
23. Focus group discussion, male worker from a non-compliant factory, Narayanganj, 21
September 2018.
24. Focus group discussion, female worker from an A&A factory, Narayanganj, 21 September
2018.
25. Focus group discussion, male worker from an A&A factory, Gazipur, 14 September 2018.
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HAVE THE ACCORD AND ALLIANCE INITIATIVES MADE A
DIFFERENCE?
Workers’ Perspectives
Our analysis so far has found that, independent of factory size, A&A affil-
iation was significantly and positively associated with many, though not
all, of our measures of wages and working conditions. However, the cross-
sectional nature of our data means that we cannot attribute these differences
to efforts associated with the two agreements since it is equally possible
— and indeed very plausible — that their global signatories were already
working with factories with better working conditions before Rana Plaza.
We therefore turn to a series of questions in our survey which sought
workers’ own views about change to help us with the issue of causal-
ity. These asked workers if they had heard of Rana Plaza. In fact, all
the workers in the survey had heard of Rana Plaza; indeed 10 per cent
knew of someone who had died or been injured. They were then asked
whether and what changes they had observed taking place since Rana
Plaza. Finally, they were asked why they thought these changes had taken
place.
The questions about perceived changes in working conditions were asked
in relation to the issues discussed earlier. Responses could vary between
‘improvements’, ‘deterioration’ or ‘no change’ (see Table 3). Improvements
were most frequently mentioned in relation to healthier working environment
(87 per cent); building safety (85 per cent); and improved safety training (83
per cent). The frequency with which improvements were reported for other
issues was lower and more varied: the opportunity to complain (68 per
cent); timely payment of salary (63 per cent); salary and benefits (59 per
cent); behaviour of supervisors (57 per cent); behaviour of managers (56 per
cent); job security (47 per cent); opportunities for training and promotion
(26 per cent); overtime hours (18.7 per cent); and sexual harassment (13
per cent). A deterioration in conditions was most likely to be reported in
relation to overtime (40 per cent). For all other conditions, around 10 per cent
or less reported deterioration while higher percentages did not report any
change.
In order to explore whether we can attribute these reported changes at
least partly to the influence of A&A, we carried out regression analysis to
estimate the strength of the association between the changes in question
and A&A affiliation while controlling for other possible direct or mediating
influences. Given its importance in predicting variations in factory condi-
tions, and the greater likelihood of A&A affiliation in larger factories, we
included factory size as one of these influences. While visits by inspectors
were associated with A&A remediation processes, the indicator we chose
was whether workers had spoken with inspectors as evidence of pro-active
engagement. We also hypothesized that more effective WPCs (as measured
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by a WPC effectiveness index of 4 or 5) were more likely to be associated
with improvements in working conditions. Finally, we expected that workers
who joined their current factory before Rana Plaza were more likely to be
aware of changes that took place subsequently. The results of our regression
analysis (see Table 5) can be summarized as follows: Workers in factories
with A&A affiliation were more likely than those in non-affiliated facto-
ries to report improvements in building safety, healthy environment, safety
training, opportunities for complaint, opportunities for training, timeliness
of payments and sexual harassment. They were significantly less likely to
report improvements in behaviour of supervisors (a reflection perhaps of the
issues raised in the FGDs), while differences in terms of salary and other
benefits, overtime hours, job security and opportunities for promotion were
not significant.
Factory size on its own did not appear to be significantly associated with
indicators of improvement except that smaller factories were less likely
to report improvements in building safety than larger ones and (unexpect-
edly) more likely to report improvements in management behaviour. The
coefficients for the interaction between factory size and A&A affiliation
suggest that the positive impact of A&A affiliation on improvements in
safety training, timely payments and opportunities for training were weaker
in smaller factories. They also suggest that among small factories, A&A-
affiliated factories were less likely to report improvements in the behaviour
of management, salary and benefits and opportunities for promotion than
non-affiliated ones. Direct interaction with inspectors by workers in the past
year was positive, associated with improvements in health and safety con-
ditions, management behaviour, timely payments, job security and sexual
harassment.
The results for the WPC effectiveness index were particularly striking.
Workers who reported more effective WPCs reported positive changes in
all our indicators of change. In other words, the effectiveness attributed
to these WPCs appeared to be borne out by their ability to bring about
important changes within their factories. Lastly, workers who had joined
their factory before Rana Plaza were more likely to report improvements in
salary and benefits, health and safety conditions, opportunities for complaint,
opportunities for training and promotion and timeliness of payments. Asked
what they believed to be the most important reasons for the changes reported,
88 per cent of the workers believed it was pressure from buyers, while
an additional 31 per cent explicitly identified the Accord or Alliance (see
Table 6). Given that many workers had not heard of the Accord or the
Alliance, it is possible that responses identifying ‘buyer pressure’ included
pressure exerted by the Accord and Alliance. Buyers were thus perceived
as the primary guardians of workers’ welfare and rights. Other drivers of
change mentioned by workers included: government policy (43 per cent);
owners’ commitments (25 per cent); BGMEA (9 per cent); the media (7 per
cent); and pressure from trade unions (0.4 per cent).
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Table 6. Reasons Given by Workers for Reported Changes in Wages and
Working Conditions since Rana Plaza
Small (0–599) Medium/large (600+) Total
A&A No-A&A Total A&A No-A&A Total A&A No-A&A Total
N 98 152 250 1,148 102 1,250 1,246 254 1,500
Why did factory make these changes?
Buyer pressure 88.8 84.2 86.0 88.8 89.2 88.8 88.8 86.2 88.3
Government policy 42.9 41.4 42.0 42.9 52.0 43.7 42.9 45.7 43.4
Accord/Alliance 17.4 2.6 8.4 37.5 8.8 35.2 36.0 5.1 30.7
Owner commitment 27.6 30.9 29.6 23.3 25.5 23.5 23.7 28.7 24.5
BGMEA 8.2 12.5 10.8 8.9 7.8 8.8 8.8 10.6 9.1
Media pressure 3.1 5.9 4.8 7.1 5.9 7.0 6.8 5.9 6.7
Trade union pressure 0 0 0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.4
Source: see Table 1.
These results suggest a number of important points. They support the
hypothesis that efforts associated with A&A affiliation were either directly
responsible for improvements in various aspects of working conditions or
else they created a hospitable environment for improvements, such as those
mandated by the amended labour laws. This hypothesis is further supported
by the significance of the association between the likelihood of improve-
ments and pro-active inspection processes which are a major feature of the
A&A initiatives. It is also indirectly supported by the finding that improve-
ments in working conditions were more likely to be reported by workers
who had joined their current factory before Rana Plaza and were thus in a
position to observe subsequent changes.
The role of the WPCs is interesting. While workers from A&A-affiliated
factories were generally more likely to report effective WPCs, it was those
who reported the WPC effectiveness index of 4 or 5 who were most likely to
report improvements in all our indicators of change, an effect independent
of A&A affiliation. These workers came from just 40 of the 240 factories
in our sample. So, while the WPCs may indeed represent a nascent form
of workplace democracy of the kind that Donaghey and Reinecke (2018)
associate with the Accord, the greater effectiveness of some WPCs relative
to others within Accord-affiliated factories suggest other factors mattered as
well, for example, variations in quality of factory management.
A final important point to make relates to aspects of working conditions
where improvements appeared slow or non-existent, the ‘sticking points’ in
the processes of change associated with the Accord and Alliance. The first
relates to basic salaries. While more than half the workers in our survey
believed that there had been an improvement in salaries and benefits since
Rana Plaza, this improvement did not appear to be associated with A&A
affiliation (Table 5) nor was there any significant difference in basic salaries
by factory affiliation, once factory size had been controlled for (Table 4a).
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The second relates to working hours. Overtime was compulsory in most
factories, affiliation status made no difference to the length of the working
day and a high percentage of workers were dissatisfied with their hours
of work (Table 3). While many more workers in the survey reported a
deterioration in their working hours since Rana Plaza, regardless of factory
affiliation status (Table 3), our FGDs suggested that this might reflect the
increase in work intensity that came with stricter controls over overtime
hours rather than an increase in working hours. A third area of continuity
relates to the mistreatment of workers. Around half of the workers reported
an improvement in such behaviour since Rana Plaza, but again this did not
appear to be associated with A&A affiliation (Table 5). However, it is worth
noting that workers in A&A-affiliated factories were somewhat less likely
to report such mistreatment (Table 4b). The final area relates to mechanisms
for workers to voice their concerns. We noted evidence of change in terms
of the spread of elected WPCs, but we also noted the continued absence of
trade unions, regardless of factory affiliation.
Employers’ Perspectives
We set out in this article to explore whether new collaborative approaches
to CSR exemplified by the A&A in Bangladesh had overcome some of
the limitations of previous compliance-based approaches. Our analysis of
the garment workers’ survey would lead us to offer a qualified yes to this
question: important aspects of wages and working conditions, particularly
conditions relating to structural safety, were considerably better in A&A-
affiliated factories; workers believed that there had been improvements in
many of these conditions since Rana Plaza; and most of them attributed these
improvements directly to A&A or indirectly to buyer pressure. However, it
became clear from the findings of interviews carried out with managers of
A&A-affiliated factories as part of the larger project (Rahman and Rahman,
this issue) that the perspectives of the workers in our survey were circum-
scribed by their position at the bottom of the value chain. They had limited
knowledge of power dynamics higher up the global value chain. The man-
agers, on the other hand, were the stakeholders who interacted most directly
with the buyers and were directly responsible for implementing the two ini-
tiatives. Their initial response to A&A had been favourable: they believed it
offered a coordinated framework for improving health and safety conditions
within the industry and the opportunity to improve the country’s tarnished
reputation.
This early enthusiasm appeared to have given way over time to greater
ambivalence. This partly reflected technical problems associated with A&A
procedures — duplication of inspection efforts, inconsistency in findings,
miscommunications, unrealistic timetables and so on. But their greatest bit-
terness was reserved for the fact that while buyers paid for the costs of
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inspection, they failed to share the greater financial burden associated with
the remediation and relocation measures recommended by inspectors (see
also Barrett et al., 2018). This went against the expectations created by
Article 22 of the Accord: ‘participating brands and retailers will negotiate
commercial terms with their suppliers which ensure that it is financially
feasible for the factories to maintain safe workplaces and comply with up-
grade and remediation requirements instituted by the Safety Inspector’.26
On the contrary, the purchasing practices of lead buyers were antithetical
to the financial feasibility of local suppliers. Not only did they fail to in-
crease the procurement prices paid to their suppliers, which would have
been one way to offset some of the remediation/relocation costs incurred by
the latter, but the prices they paid continued their steady long-term decline.
According to Anner (2018), between 2011 and 2016, prices declined by
10.7 per cent for items exported to the US and by 9.04 per cent for items
exported to Europe. As he points out (ibid.: 7), these declines had little to
do with changes in the price of raw materials or fluctuations in exchange
rates.
Anner (ibid.: 15) also notes a steady reduction in delivery times. In 2011,
the major global brands gave factories in Bangladesh an average of 94 days
to complete an order; by 2016, this had dropped to 86 days, a reduction
of 8.14 per cent. This translated into the intensified pressure to meet pro-
duction targets which workers attributed to management. With wages going
up while purchasing prices went down, it is not surprising that profit mar-
gins declined among Bangladesh suppliers — by 13.3 per cent between
2011 and 2016 — leaving them with a mean profit margin of 7.69 per
cent (ibid.: 7). Rahman and Rahman (this issue) report that 70 per cent of
the managers they interviewed reported profit margins of between 0 and
5 per cent.
It would appear therefore that while the shift from compliance to cooper-
ation has been accompanied by a number of important improvements, it has
left long-standing asymmetries in power relationships within global value
chains largely intact.27 The persistence of these asymmetries of power goes
some way towards explaining the ‘stickiness’ in employer practices revealed
by our survey: the resistance to paying a basic living wage; reliance on com-
pulsory overtime and increasing intensification of workloads; mistreatment
of workers who fail to meet production targets; and active hostility towards
trade unions who might seek to challenge these practices.
26. For more on Article 22 of the Accord, see: http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/global-forum/
2013_S1_1.pdf
27. Indeed, a 2005 study carried out with local stakeholders by Mahmud and Kabeer (2006: 232)
reported complaints by managers about the compliance model, and the mismatch between
rhetoric and responsibilities it entailed, that were uncannily similar to those reported by
managers today.
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CONCLUSION
Revisiting Stakeholder Theory: The Empirical Approach
While the persistence of exploitative practices on the factory floor may
be worse in Bangladesh than elsewhere, they are not unique to it. As
Locke (2013: 126) points out, poor working conditions, excessive work-
ing hours, precarious employment practices and low wages appear endemic
to production for global supply chains. This means we cannot understand
the persistence and pervasiveness of these practices by focusing on in-
dividual factories or countries. We need to move from a narrow ‘spot-
light’ perspective which confines our gaze to the locus of production to
a ‘floodlight’ approach which illuminates the broader political economy
of supply chain capitalism within which these production processes are
located.
This broader perspective would draw attention to the growing concentra-
tion within the retail sectors of the US and Europe which has endowed a
small number of global brands and retailers with disproportionate bargain-
ing power vis-à-vis the large and growing numbers of suppliers dispersed in
low-wage economies across the developing world. It would also reveal how
the rise of the new ‘fast fashion’ business model has fuelled the demand by
consumers in affluent countries for a greater variety of clothing every year at
ever-cheaper prices, proving particularly inimical to the promotion of decent
working conditions in supplier factories (Oxfam, 2004; Taplin, 2014).
Empirical stakeholder analysis, as opposed to normative or instrumental
stakeholder theory (Egels-Zandén and Sandberg, 2010), suggests the reverse
of the win-win model cited earlier. The major brands and buyers have been
able to use the unequal distribution of bargaining power within global chains
to compel their suppliers to meet the competitive pressures generated by
the fast fashion model, producing increasing varieties of products within
shorter lead times and at decreasing prices. While they may insist on supplier
compliance with their codes of conduct to avoid reputational risk, they do not
necessarily reward compliant factories by improving the terms they offer.28
Faced with these practices, suppliers must reduce their profit margins, pay
their workers lower wages, demand longer hours of work, hire contract
or migrant labour and take shortcuts on safety standards. Most of these
responses are evident in Bangladesh.
Other stakeholders also have restricted ‘room for manoeuvre’. Govern-
ments may have the institutional capacity and political will to enforce their
own laws but are often inhibited from doing so by their fear that it will
increase the costs of doing business, drive away global buyers and lead to a
28. See: https://apparelinsider.com/survey-raises-questions-purchasing-practices/ (accessed 7
December 2017).
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massive loss of jobs.29 Workers who bear the brunt of these practices have
little choice but to put up with them since they have neither the organiza-
tional voice to challenge their employers nor the option of seeking more
decent work opportunities.
Consumers have been only intermittently visible in stakeholder analysis.
Nor is it clear what kind of stake they have in improving the working
conditions of those who produce their clothes. Some authors believe that
consumers have demonstrated their willingness to pay higher prices for
clothes made in decent working conditions (Ross, 1997). Others are less
sanguine. As Taplin (2014: 73) observes, ‘Western consumers have become
accustomed to cheap fashion and for the most part appear unwilling to pay
more for items that are untainted by exploitative practices’. In place of
a benign version of stakeholder analysis, therefore, Taplin offers a more
pessimistic reading, arguing that the current practices in global value chains
have created a situation ‘where the “villains” are many and the innocent
caught up in the manifold uncertainties that such a model produces’ (ibid.).
The question then is what, if anything, can be done to protect the ‘innocent’
and give them a greater voice in shaping the CSR agenda.
Is ‘Shared Stakeholder Responsibility’ Possible?
In his review of various initiatives undertaken to improve labour standards
within global value chains, Locke (2013: 2) concludes that improvements
cannot be left to any single set of stakeholders or any specific set of ap-
proaches. They require new institutional arrangements that would reallocate
costs and rewards among all stakeholders engaged in these value chains,
transcending traditional boundaries between producers and consumers, buy-
ers and suppliers, NGOs and corporations and advanced and developing
countries. Given the power dynamics that characterize supply chain capital-
ism, it is difficult to envisage what these arrangements might be and how
they might materialize, but his conclusion does shift the search for solutions
away from a ‘spotlight’ perspective to a more holistic ‘floodlit’ approach.
By way of conclusion, we assess recent recommendations for advancing the
transition to a fairer set of institutional arrangements, drawing on Sobhan
(2014) to highlight the specific nature of the challenges that characterize the
Bangladesh context.
The Stern Center has outlined what it terms a ‘shared responsibility model’
to address remaining health and safety problems in the RMG industry in
Bangladesh after the Accord and Alliance (Barrett et al., 2018). It recom-
mends an international task force, led by Bangladeshi stakeholders, who
29. This appears to be happening in Bangladesh. Latest estimates suggest that 450,000 workers
lost jobs due to the closure of 1,250 factories (Transparency International Bangladesh,
2019).
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will coordinate efforts to raise the funds necessary to complete this task
and oversee the implementation process. Along with the Bangladeshi gov-
ernment and RMG employers, they envisage financial contributions from
international actors, including Western buyers as well as governments in
countries that import garments from Bangladesh — the EU and US together
account for 80 per cent of the country’s exports.
While there are self-evident reasons why the Bangladesh government and
RMG employers should contribute to improving conditions in the sector, the
case made by the Stern proposal for involving Western buyers and govern-
ments is based on appeals to a sense of fairness and ‘special obligations’.
Yet the commitments frequently expressed by these actors to economic jus-
tice for workers in global value chains surely demands a much stronger and
more institutionalized model of shared responsibility, one based on the fairer
distribution of rights as well as responsibilities across the value chain rather
than on special pleading on behalf of its weakest stakeholders?
Most global buyers, as we have seen, have not shown much inclination
in this direction despite the normative, instrumental and developmental ar-
guments in its favour, but their governments are in a position to make a
difference. These governments currently siphon off a substantial share of
the revenue generated by value chain production, in the form of 15 per cent
tariffs imposed on imports of garments into the US30 and 19 per cent value
added tax levied on all goods and services sold in the EU (Bain, 2018; Nor-
field, 2011). The concerns these governments have expressed for the rights
of the global workforce that makes clothing for their citizens would be more
credible if they were backed by commensurate obligations on their part.
These could be met by routinely redistributing some of the revenue they
collect from imports from Bangladesh and other lower-income exporting
countries back to the countries in question both to ensure that their indus-
tries have the resources to provide decent working conditions and to promote
mechanisms within civil society to hold the industry accountable.
The question of national regulation is clearly problematic in Bangladesh.
The failures of government oversight that contributed to the conditions
prevailing in the RMG sector are part of a broader crisis of governance
failure within the country. While there is no doubt that the government
needs to take much greater responsibility for the rights of its workers, as
it must for the rights of all its citizens, the present state of governance in
Bangladesh suggests that this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.
What the government may be willing to strive for, given its stake in pro-
tecting its highest export-earning industry, is to build the RMG sector into
30. As Sobhan (2014: n.p.) points out, the level of US tariffs on imported clothing from
Bangladesh meant that it was contributing around US$ 720 million annually to the US
Treasury at the time of Rana Plaza while receiving less than US$ 200 million in aid from
the US: ‘the paradox of a net transfer of resources from . . . a least developed country to
the world’s wealthiest country’.
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what Sobhan (2014: n.p.) terms ‘an island of good governance . . . in an
ocean of mal-governance’. Such an approach will lead inevitably to the fur-
ther bifurcation of an already bifurcated industry (Barrett et al., 2018). It will
give rise to a small island of large, regularly-inspected ‘good’ factories, with
internationally acceptable labour standards, exporting to Western countries,
surrounded by an ocean of ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ factories with poor working
conditions and minimum oversight (similar in other words to the informal
working conditions that prevail in the rest of the country) which export to
countries like Turkey and Russia which have few concerns about workers’
rights.
Garment employers clearly have a stake in the survival of their industry.
Whether a BGMEA whose past leadership has been dominated by those
most resistant to regulation will be able to take a more enlightened view in
the future remains to be seen. But garment employers are not a homogeneous
group. Many have improved conditions in their factories independently of
international pressure. They can either push the BGMEA in the direction
of achievable labour standards as the industry’s contribution to a shared
responsibility model or set up their own associations in order to provide an
example of enlightened leadership for the rest of the industry.
Other recommendations within the CSR literature relate to initiatives
by trade unions, labour rights NGOs, the ILO and others to build skills
and organizational capacity within garment factories to improve working
conditions and comply with national regulations. As Locke suggests, each
of these may have limited impact on their own but they can mutually reinforce
each other to amplify impact. Of particular importance from the Bangladesh
perspective are those initiatives that seek to build the voices of workers in the
industry — the stakeholders with most to gain from improvements in labour
standards and workers’ rights. Labour movement scholars and activists have
focused primarily on trade unions as the key institutional actors to bring
about change. While the troubled history of trade unionism in Bangladesh
has meant that progress has been exceedingly slow, it has not been absent.
The recent scholarship on this issue has been motivated by the promise
of industrial democracy held out by the Accord. Zajak (2017: 1015), for
instance, has argued, that the presence of the Accord provides a ‘shadow of
protection’ to efforts by local unions affiliated to its signatories to address
workers’ grievances while the interactions between these unions and inter-
national organizations and alliances have increased their strategizing skills.
These skills and experiences are unlikely to disappear when the agreements
come to an end. But nor did the struggle for workers’ rights come into
existence with the inception of these agreements.
As longer-standing scholarship on the industry points out, localized protest
movements have been occurring on a sporadic basis for over two decades
but they have been mainly led by unregistered factory-based unions and left-
wing federations outside the spotlight of global value chain research (Khan,
2001; Mahmud and Kabeer, 2006; Rahman and Langford, 2012; Siddiqi,
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2017). Such actions testify to the growth of a ‘practical’ as opposed to a
‘discursive’ class consciousness among workers (Rahman and Langford,
2012), one that was not in evidence in research from the 1980s and early
1990s but has clearly evolved over time. It is this practical consciousness
that was at play in 2006 when two small independent leftist unions were
able to mobilize militant mass action for higher minimum wages on a scale
never previously seen in the history of the industry. It is also this practical
consciousness that has fuelled subsequent ‘wildcat’, often violent, agitations
that have led to periodic increases in the minimum wage. As a number of
authors point out, this form of ‘collective bargaining by riot’31 or ‘collective
labour militancy recast as senseless vandalism’ (Ashraf and Prentice, 2019:
104) can be seen as an understandable response to the persistent repression
of more legitimate forms of collective bargaining. It has proved remarkably
effective at least in achieving wage rises.
This older scholarship has also pointed out that it was not just trade unions
on their own that contributed to the growth of worker consciousness. Dif-
ferent sections of civil society, including human rights activists, feminist
groups, legal organizations and progressive policy think-tanks, who are ac-
tive in promoting democratic process and the rule of law within the country,
have also been active in supporting the struggle for labour standards and
workers’ rights in the garment sector. They do not view these struggles as
distinct from each other (Ashraf and Prentice, 2019; Hossain and Hossain,
forthcoming; Mahmud and Kabeer, 2006; Rahman and Langford, 2012; Sid-
diqi, 2017). They recognize that success in promoting workers’ rights in the
most significant industry in the country may help catalyse change in other
sectors of the economy, a version of the ‘lighthouse effect’.32 At the same
time, they are also aware that gains in relation to workers’ rights in the
garment sector are unlikely to be sustained in the absence of citizens’ rights
in the wider society. For these organizations, the process of building voice
and representation among workers in garment sector has to be carried out
as part and parcel of efforts to build a broader culture of rights within the
country — otherwise CSR initiatives, however well-intentioned, will con-
tinue to remain mired in the short-term instrumentalism of its more powerful
stakeholders.
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